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Diversified and focused business models may affect foreign bank efficiency differently. We 
investigate whether there is an optimal business model along three business dimensions—assets, 
funding and income—and which business model is optimal for foreign banks in a financial 
center. We apply recently developed non-parametric methods with bootstrap to estimate group 
efficiency, to test for differences across groups and finally to analyze the link between bank 
efficiency and diversification measures. Using Luxembourg bank data that include the financial 
crisis, we find that there is no unique business model. The most efficient business model appears 
to be a focused asset, funding and income strategy. Banks’ organizational forms play a role; 
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branches may be preferable to subsidiaries prior to the financial crisis, whereas bank subsidiaries 
perform better than branches during the financial crisis. However, branches diversified in assets, 
funding and income exploit efficiency advantages during the financial crisis.  
 
JEL classification: C14; F23; G21; G28 
Keywords: Foreign banks; Organizational form; Branch; Subsidiary; Asset, Funding and Income 
Diversification; Financial Crisis; DEA Group-Efficiency; Heterogeneous Bootstrap. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent global financial crisis has introduced major changes into the financial landscape. 
For instance, the financial crisis led to the demise of large investment banks and a sharp 
interruption in the steady increase of the banking industry’s internationalization during the past 
few decades in terms of both cross-border capital flows and cross-border entry in banking 
sectors. These major changes in the financial scenery, along with the particularly powerful effect 
of the increased globalization of the financial markets in the propagation of the crisis, have 
rekindled the interest of regulators, policy-makers and scholars in discussing the optimal banking 
models.  
Although the conventional wisdom in banking argues that diversification enhances bank 
performance, the recent financial crisis raises serious concerns about this statement. Indeed, 
theory provides conflicting predictions about the optimal asset and liability mix of an institution. 
Moreover, a wide range of empirical studies analyzes the link between diversification and bank 
performance without reaching a general consensus. Among these studies, few analyze the 
business model of foreign-owned banks; most adopt the perspective of global banks (at the 
consolidated level). However, in countries where foreign banks are the main component of the 
banking system, as is the case of financial centers, the analysis of the link between the business 
model and bank performance becomes an important issue. In view of the pressure on foreign 
banks to maintain market shares and remain competitive due to the technological advancements 
and the globalization of the financial system, along with the important role of foreign banks to 
guarantee the access to financial services of the country configured as a financial center (see 
Clarke et al., 2003; Claessens, 2006; Chopra, 2007; Cull and Martinez Peria, 2011), this type of 
analysis is worth undertaking to discover the optimal bank business model that allows for the 
subsistence of foreign banks in the market.  
The main goal of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the optimal business models 
adopted by foreign banks operating in a peculiar banking system, i.e., the financial center, and to 
evaluate whether their business models adjusted during the financial crisis. The paper also 
attempts to analyze whether optimal business models for foreign banks are related to their 
organizational form.  
To identify an efficient or “optimal” business model, we use technical efficiency measures to 
assess how well management deploys technology, staff and other resources to produce a given 
level of output. Technical efficiency has also been closely linked to the likelihood of a bank 
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default (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995), so we assume that better business models will be 
associated with higher technical efficiency. Because foreign banks are exposed to intense 
competition globally, technical efficiency is a foreign bank-chosen objective because it is a 
necessary condition for ensuring their sustenance in the market.  
We follow the academic literature in using diversification measures to analyze bank business 
models, and we evaluate the effect of diversification strategies on firm performance using the 
focus index, which is based on the sum of squares of shares in different bank balance sheets and 
income mix items. Although most existing studies analyze bank business models in terms of the 
asset mix and/or income mix,
1
 in this paper, we also consider the funding mix, adding a third 
dimension to the analysis of the bank business model. The role played by the bank funding 
strategy was recognized as crucial for bank intermediation activities as soon as the banking 
industry became significantly more complex, global and dependent on financial markets’ 
developments due to the structural changes brought by financial deregulation and financial 
innovation. As Borio (2009) notes, changes in funding strategies can be triggered by weaknesses 
on the asset side.  
We analyze the financial center of Luxembourg, which has the highest presence of foreign 
banks and foreign banks assets in Europe (Claessens and Van Horen, 2012).
2
 We test whether 
there is a single business model that improves the performance of all foreign-owned banks within 
this financial center and whether the financial crisis led foreign banks to alter their business 
model. Moreover, given the differences between the two forms of foreign bank organization 
(branch and subsidiary), another question addressed in the paper is whether the trade-off between 
diversification and specialization depends on the bank’s organizational form.  
Regarding the topic of optimal business models and organizational forms, it is worth noting 
that an important aspect of foreign banks is the type of organizational form (branches vs. 
subsidiaries) chosen to operate in their intermediation activity abroad. The two organizational 
forms might provide different incentives towards the diversification (or specialization) of the 
intermediation activities. From an economic point of view, branches and subsidiaries may not 
benefit equally from diversification, which has consequences for the optimal corporate structure. 
However, despite the clear legal distinction between branches and subsidiaries, in practice, they 
                                                             
1 The EU Second Banking Directive (1989/646/EEC) prompted many banks to revise their business models, 
increasing their share of noninterest income and non-traditional activities. 
2
 Initially encouraged by tax and regulatory advantages, the Luxembourg financial center increasingly concentrated 
expertise in different aspects of international banking (OECD, 2010). Most recently, it developed as a center for 
private banking, investment fund domiciliation and liquidity management within multinational banking groups. 
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may be operated and managed similarly.
3
 Nevertheless, for now, it is not yet clear how cross-
border banking groups choose between these different forms to organize their business model. 
Our empirical approach relies on a combination of the non-parametric test of equalities of 
distributions, group-based data envelopment analysis (DEA), truncated regression and the 
bootstrap method. First, we study the cross-section distribution of bank diversification to assess 
the extent of divergence in business models across banks. Because our analysis spans from 1995 
to 2009, we also check whether the cross-section distribution changed over time using the Li test 
adapted to the DEA context (Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006), which allows us to detect whether the 
business model changed during the crisis. If in this first analysis different business models 
appear, then we group banks and estimate their group efficiency and relative confidence intervals 
by combining DEA and the group-wise heterogeneous bootstrap (Simar and Zelenyuk, 2007), 
where the statistical significance about the equality of group efficiency is tested using the Li test. 
Finally, to quantify the relationship between the business model and efficiency and to 
disentangle the possible effects of other variables, we employ a semi-parametric approach using 
DEA with a truncated regression and a bootstrap (Simar and Wilson, 2007). In this last analysis, 
the estimated individual technical inefficiency score is linked with bank-specific characteristics 
including the degree of diversification and the organizational form. Overall, the combined 
methodologies are used not only to allow the identification of possible heterogeneity in the bank 
business model but to provide statistical significance tests of the results obtained. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature on 
diversification in the banking and on financial centers. Section 3 describes the empirical research 
strategy, and Section 4 presents the data sample and variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
We separate the literature review into two sections: (i) literature on the effect of the business 
model on bank performance and (ii) literature on the banking industry in financial centers. 
 
 
                                                             
3
 In practice, large bank groups might operate abroad through their own branches or subsidiaries depending on 
cross-country differences between the home parent county and the host country in terms of regulation, tax regime 
and the business model at the parent-bank level. 
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2.1. Literature on the effect of the business model on bank performance 
The existing literature on bank performance using diversification measures to identify the 
business model is characterized by two important limitations: (i) It has used a wide variety of 
bank performance measures, and (ii) it has used many measures of bank diversification. Perhaps 
as a result, there is still no consensus despite the volume of literature. 
Some studies explore whether markets value diversified banks more highly by using asset and 
income-based measures of diversification. The empirical evidence is mixed. Baele et al. (2007) 
find a strong positive relationship between franchise value and the degree of functional 
diversification for European banks over the period 1989-2004. However, Laeven and Levine 
(2007) find that worldwide financial conglomerates have lower market value than stand-alone 
institutions that produce the same financial services. Schmid and Walter (2009) support this 
finding for U.S. financial conglomerates (including non-bank institutions). Elsas et al. (2010) 
reach the opposite conclusion, finding that income diversification does not reduce shareholder 
value and actually improves bank profitability.  
Other studies explore whether diversification can reduce earnings volatility by combining 
traditional intermediation and non-interest income activities. For the U.S. banking sector, several 
authors provide evidence that there are no significant benefits for earnings or earnings volatility 
(risk; e.g., DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). This is because 
fee-based activities increase the volatility of bank income and because net interest income and 
non-interest income are increasingly correlated. For European banks, the evidence is mixed. 
Some find that increased reliance on non-interest income has stabilized profits (Smith et al., 
2003; Chiarozzo et al., 2008). However, Lepetit et al. (2008) show that expanding into non-
interest income activities raises the risk of volatility and insolvency. This positive link with risk 
is most clear for small banks and is essentially driven by commission and fee activities.   
In terms of asset measures of diversification, the findings are also mixed concerning the effect 
on bank returns and risk. Acharya et al. (2006) find no evidence that diversification in loan mix 
is associated with higher return and/or lower risk, whereas Rossi et al. (2009) find that asset 
diversification raises profit efficiency by reducing bank risk and cost efficiency. Curi et al. 
(2013) find evidence that asset diversification is positively associated with the technical 
efficiency of foreign banks operating in a financial center. However, Elyasiani and Wang (2012) 
show the opposite for a sample of U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1997-2007.  
Finally, a few recent papers extend the diversification concept to banks’ funding strategies. 
Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) use the share of non-deposit funding to measure 
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diversification and find risk benefits from raising it from low levels. However, at higher levels of 
non-interest income and non-deposit funding, further increases in diversification result in higher 
bank risk. Berger et al. (2010) found that specialization in deposits (as along with loans and 
assets) was associated with higher profit and cost efficiency for a sample of Chinese banks; 
however, this paper neglects the income diversification. 
In the above literature, no paper uses technical efficiency to measure bank performance, and 
none jointly analyzes the three dimensions we consider (asset mix, income mix and funding 
mix). Considering the importance of banks’ funding strategies on their performance, few papers 
have extended the diversification concept to consider the funding mix, and those that have done 
so have analyzed only some funding sources. Finally, most papers focus on bank holding 
companies. The financial crisis has not—to our knowledge—been systematically examined. 
 
2.2. Literature on the banking industry in financial centers 
The empirical literature that analyzes banking in financial centers is limited and focuses on 
international financial centers located in Europe (Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg) or 
in Asia (Hong Kong and Singapore). All of the studies mentioned below focused on analyzing 
the production process. Particularly, mostly of them analyze operational, cost or profit efficiency, 
and productivity more rarely evaluated. 
Rime and Stiroh (2003) found that both specialized and universal banks in Switzerland 
operate with relatively large cost and profit inefficiencies. Size plays a crucial role; whereas 
small and mid-size banks experience cost scale economies, the largest universal banks do not. 
Larger banks do not benefit substantially from economies of scale or product diversification. 
Burgstaller and Cocca (2011) find that banks in Liechtenstein perform better than their Swiss 
counterparts. In the two financial centers, relatively large technical and scale inefficiency are 
linked to specialization and investment but not to bank size. Curi et al. (2013) link technical 
efficiency in Luxembourg banks to specific characteristics such as size, organizational form, and 
home- and host-country characteristics. They find that the organizational form plays a crucial 
role and that banks have higher technical efficiency on average if their parent bank is located in 
the euro area. Kwan (2006) finds that the cost inefficiency of Hong Kong banks is large but 
declines over time. Large banks seem less cost-efficient than small banks, although the former 
tend to converge with the latter over time. Finally, Sufian and Majid (2007) find that scale 
inefficiency outperforms pure inefficiency in Singapore banks, although the average efficiency 
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level is high. Increasing bank size has become the greatest source of bank inefficiency in 
Singapore.  
The only work that analyzes bank productivity in a financial center used data on banks in 
Luxembourg. Mixed results reflect different econometric approaches and sample periods. Guarda 
and Rouabah (2007, 2009) analyzed the quarterly productivity growth of Luxembourg banks 
prior to the financial crisis and found positive productivity growth since the mid-1990s, with 
persistent and pro-cyclical dynamics. Larger banks are found to be more productive, and a 
Malmquist index analysis suggests that efficiency change dominates technical change. Curi and 
Lozano-Vivas (2013) examine the productivity of Luxembourg banks, accounting for 
organizational form, size and nationality. The results indicate that banks responded to the 
financial crisis with technological improvements. In normal times (before the crisis), branches 
and subsidiaries followed a similar productivity path. Technical change seems to be the main 
source of productivity improvements.  
None of the papers above considered the business model of foreign banks in financial centers 
or whether the type of organizational structure can moderate the effect of diversification on 
performance.  
3. Empirical research strategy  
 
In a nutshell, this paper aims to unveil evidence on the most technically efficient business 
model for foreign banks operating in a financial center. To do so, we apply a multi-step 
methodology. 
First, we study the cross-section distribution of bank diversification to assess the extent of 
heterogeneity in business models across banks. Given that the sample covers different periods, 
we also check whether the cross-section distributions changed over time. Because the financial 
crisis is included in the period under analysis, the study of the cross-section distribution changes 
over time should give some insight into whether the banks adjusted their business models during 
the crisis period. 
The cross-section distribution is estimated using the kernel density estimator with optimal 
bandwidth selected by the Sheather and Jones (1991) method, and banks are categorized as either 
focused or diversified using thresholds located between peaks in the estimated distributions. This 
analysis distinguishes whether there is a single business model that can fit all banks.  
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Among several possible tests, we follow Li (1996) to test the null hypothesis of equal 
distributions against the alternative hypothesis of different distributions.
4
 Intuitively, the Li-test 
measures the lack of overlap between the masses of any two distributions, and therefore it can 
detect differences in all the moments simultaneously. For this reason, the Li-test is generally 
superior than using other moment-based criteria. Testing for equality is based on the null 
hypothesis that two distributions are equal. To ensure more accurate inference, we apply 
consistent bootstrap suggested by Li (1999) and adapted by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) to the 
case of DEA context. Specifically, we estimate the bootstrap-based p-value as 
 
 
              , 
where            is an indicator function yielding 1 if          is true and 0 otherwise, B is the 
number of bootstrap replications,    is the Li (1996) test statistic given above, adapted to DEA 
context using Algorithm 2 from Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), and     is its bootstrap analogue in 
bootstrap replication b.  A consistent bootstrap involves re-sampling under the null hypothesis by 
drawing randomly from the largest group in the sample using the empirical distribution function 
(see Li, 1999 for more details). 
In our second step, we use the concept of technical efficiency
5
 to identify the most efficient or 
“optimal” business model.  
We estimate operational efficiency at the bank level using a non-parametric estimator referred 
to as data envelopment analysis (DEA).
6
 Operational efficiency for each bank is the distance 
from the actual observation to the DEA-estimated, best-practice production frontier (of 
technology), computed using the Farrell-type (Farrell, 1957), output-oriented measure.
7
 This 
measure provides a score that is bound between unity and infinity, where a score of unity 
indicates a bank on the estimated technology frontier (technical efficiency 100%) and a score 
                                                             
4 See Atkinson (1970), Shorrocks (1978), Quah (1996), Bianchi (1997), Maasoumi et al. (2007) for similar analyses 
in other contexts. 
5
 Three main reasons explain our choice of technical efficiency as benchmark bank performance measure to identify 
optimal business model: (i) Because foreign banks in a financial center are exposed to intense competition globally, 
being technically efficient is a necessary condition not only to guarantee their subsistence in the market but also to 
prevent imbalances in the process of developing the economy; (ii) as Berger et al (2007) note, using economic 
efficiency in place of technical efficiency for the special case of foreign banks may be misleading because 
externalities affecting their parent bank may prevent them from optimally choosing their minimal cost or maximum 
profits; (iii) the available data sets on foreign banks generally include information on the performance of the bank 
but not on the entire multinational organization. At this point, we would like to note that as extension of our 
analysis, it would be interesting to adopt a risk-adjusted production model such as the one proposed by Hughes 
(1999) as an anonymous referee recommends.   
6 DEA avoids assumptions on the functional form of the production technology and allows multiple inputs and 
outputs. 
7
 The Farrell measure satisfies a set of desirable mathematical properties for an efficiency measure, requires 
relatively simple computation and allows for a straightforward interpretation of technical efficiency. This measure is 
the reciprocal of the Shephard (1970) output distance function. 
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greater than unity represents a bank below the frontier. The reciprocal of the Farrell-type, output-
oriented efficiency measure indicates the efficiency level of the bank relative to the estimated 
best-practice frontier. This measure can also be used as the relative efficiency rank of the bank 
within the sample. 
If different banks in the sample operate with several business models, given the results 
obtained in our first step, then it is relevant to estimate aggregate or group efficiency and their 
confidence intervals by combining DEA with the group-wise heterogeneous bootstrap (Simar 
and Zelenyuk, 2007).  
To test whether banks with different business models are equally efficient, we construct a 
weighted efficiency score (WGE) for each group (i.e., each business model), with “within” 
weights derived from the aggregation structure based on economic optimization (see Färe and 
Zelenyuk, 2003; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2007). For each WGE, we then study sensitivity to 
sampling variation, estimating confidence intervals and corrections for the bias inherent in the 
DEA procedure by implementing the heterogeneous sub-sampling bootstrap algorithm. Lastly, to 
statistically test whether the estimated WGEs for each group are different, we perform the 
pairwise tests of the null hypothesis that WGEs are equal across bank business models. In 
performing such a test, let us suppose we have diversified and focused business models; then, the 
null hypothesis of interest is, 
      
      ,  
where     is the weighted efficiency score for the group of “focused” banks, and      is 
that for the group of “diversified” banks. The test is based on the relative difference (RD) 
statistic, defined as: 
 
              ,       (1) 
where the null hypothesis (equal efficiency) is rejected (at a selected level of confidence) if the 
bootstrapped confidence interval for      does not contain unity. If so, the null hypothesis 
would be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the diversified banks are more 
inefficient (more efficient) as a group than are focused banks if        (if       ). It is 
important to recall that this analysis is extended to check whether banks with different 
organizational forms, given their business models, are equally efficient.  
Finally, the third step of our empirical strategy is to estimate a multivariate relationship 
between business models and efficiency controlling for other bank-specific characteristics, 
including organizational form. This type of examination enables us to banish the doubt of 
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whether the relationship between efficiency and business models disappear due to effects related 
to the bank’s organizational form, along with several other bank-specific characteristics.  
To perform the analysis, we follow the truncated regression with bootstrap approach, 
suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007), to analyze the following relationship:  
 
, , , , , , 1,..., ; 1,...,k t k t k t k t k tTE DIV OF CSV u k n t T             (2) 
where tkTE ,  is the technical (in-)efficiency of bank k at time t, tkDIV ,  is the diversification 
variable, tkOF ,  is a dummy variable for the organizational form, and tkCSV ,  is a vector of control 
variables that capture bank-specific characteristics or structural variables that might have an 
effect on the efficiency. Lastly, tku ,  is a random error that must satisfy the theoretical restriction 
that , 1k tTE  ; therefore, tku ,  is a truncated random variable such that ,1 ,, tktk Zu   for all 
1,..., ; 1,...,k n t T  . To handle such a truncation problem, we use the truncated regression 
approach assuming 
2~ (0, )kt uu N   such that ,1 ,, tktk Zu  nk ,...,1  and Tt ,...,1 , where 
2
u  
is estimated along with the estimation of   using the maximum likelihood method. To improve 
accuracy of inference, confidence intervals around each element in  are obtained using 
bootstrap Algorithm II from Simar and Wilson (2007), where further details can be found.
8
  
 
4. Data sample and construction of variables 
 
4.1. Data sample 
The data for this study were provided by the Luxembourg Central Bank (BCL) and 
encompass both balance sheet and profit and loss data on a quarterly basis from 1995Q1 to 
2009Q4. These data have two major advantages relative to Bankscope. First, reporting data give 
information on both subsidiary and branch banks, whereas Bankscope does not. Second, 
reporting data contain more detailed information than Bankscope. We convert data from a 
quarterly frequency to an annual frequency to avoid seasonality variations, which may bias 
                                                             
8
 Note that the dependent variable in the regression is inefficiency; therefore, a negative value of the parameter 
implies a positive effect on efficiency (i.e., a negative effect on inefficiency). 
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efficiency estimates.
9
 We use the GDP deflator to convert to constant prices with a base year of 
1995.  
We exclude domestic banks (two state-owned banks and two cooperative banks), a central 
securities depository with bank status and banks from emerging economies with a very limited 
market share. Lastly, for each period, we remove banks that have just entered operation.
10
 The 
final sample is more homogenous, focuses on established foreign banks—because domestic 
banks operate on the local markets instead of the international market—and consists of 2087 
bank-year observations, of which 1698 are subsidiary banks and 389 are branch banks, for the 
years 1995-2010.  
4.2 Construction of variables 
4.2.1 Measures of diversification 
We measure asset, funding and income diversification with a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Following Elsas et al. (2010), we define diversification (DIV) by subtracting HHI 
from unity so that it increases with diversification. For asset diversification (ADIV), we focus on 
the most significant categories for foreign banks operating in financial centers, i.e., interbank 
loans (IBLOAN), customer loans (CLOAN), government securities (GSEC), fixed income 
securities (FISEC) and other securities (OSEC), including shares, participation and other variable 
income securities.
11
 Therefore, for each bank i at time t, we calculate: 
            
         
     
 
 
  
        
     
 
 
  
       
     
 
 
  
        
     
 
 
  
       
     
 
 
             (3) 
where earning assets (EA) is the sum of the five numerators. 
For funding diversification (FDIV), we consider equity (EQUI), short-term interbank deposits 
(IBDEP), customer deposits (CDEP), short-term money market funds, such as certificates of 
deposit (CERDEP), and long-term capital market funding, such as subordinated debts (SDEBT). 
Therefore, for each bank i at time t, we calculate: 
            
       
       
 
 
  
        
       
 
 
  
      
       
 
 
  
         
       
 
 
  
        
       
 
 
  (4) 
                                                             
9 Stock variables from the balance sheets are averaged, and flow variables from the profit and loss statement are 
reported year-to-date. 
10 DeYoung and Hasan (1998), among others, argue that banks often suffer initial losses and low earnings during the 
first years of operation. 
11 Previous studies used other disaggregation, reflecting different research purposes and data availability. For 
instance, Berger et al. (2010) disaggregate loans into industry, commercial, real estate, agricultural and consumer 
loans. They disaggregate the total assets into total loans, loans to other banks, financial investments, total fixed 
assets and other assets. 
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where FUND is the sum of the five numerators.  
Lastly, for income diversification, we consider interest income (II) and commission income 
(CI), net profit from other operations (NPFO), and other non-interest income (ONII), such as 
fiduciary income, service charges, trading income and other fees, as in Elsas et al. (2010). The 
denominator, total operating income (TOI), is the sum of the four numerators. Therefore, for 
each bank i at time t, we calculate: 
            
     
      
 
 
  
     
      
 
 
  
      
      
 
 
  
       
      
 
 
     (5) 
4.2.2 Banking outputs and inputs for measuring technical (in-)efficiency 
We model bank production with a modified version of the intermediation approach (Sealey 
and Lindley, 1977), which is common in the bank efficiency literature (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). Because our sample of foreign banks operates in financial markets and/or in the internal 
capital markets within multinational groups, we distinguish wholesale from retail lending (and 
funding). Thus, we include interbank loans, customer loans and securities (including government 
securities, fixed income securities, shares, participations and other variable income securities) as 
outputs. Because Luxembourg foreign banks devote significant resources to off-balance sheet 
activities (Curi et al., 2013) and this source of income is as important as the interest margin 
(Guarda and Rouabah, 2007), we extend the set of outputs to include directly charged services 
(summing commission income, gains from financial operations and other non-interest income). 
As inputs, we include (i) labor, measured by total labor expenses,
12
 (ii) capital, measured by 
fixed assets, (iii) interbank deposits, including other liabilities, such as debt certificates and 
subordinated debts, and (iv) customer deposits. To account for the cost of producing the directly 
charged services, we extend the set of inputs to include purchased materials and services 
(including non-wage administrative costs and commissions paid). 
4.2.3 Definition of other variables 
We first explore the link between bank efficiency and diversification (along the three 
dimensions), and we then test whether this link varies with organizational form, other bank-
specific characteristics or time (given structural change in the industry). 
                                                             
12 The use of labor expenses as a proxy of labor input is widely accepted and extended in the banking literature (see 
for instance Altunbas et al. (2001), Bonin et al. (2005), among others) when there is no availability of data about the 
number of workers, as is in our case. However, even if we had detailed information about labour inputs (e.g., hours 
worked for different type of labour), it would practically be more useful to use the aggregate proxy such as labour 
cost because it takes into account the value aspect of the labour input (aggregated from different types of labour) and 
does not overburden the DEA model with the curse of dimensionality problem.  
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Foreign banks are present in Luxembourg in two different forms: branch and subsidiary 
banks. Branch banks are a direct emanation of a parent bank abroad. Diversification strategies 
are often determined at the level of the parent bank, and few (or no) restrictions on intra-group 
transfers are established. On the contrary, the parent bank is directly responsible if the branch 
becomes distressed. Subsidiary banks, instead, are separate legal entities that are financially and 
operationally self-sufficient, locally capitalized and under the direct control of local regulators 
(Fiechter et al., 2011). Because the implications for diversification are likely to be different, we 
use a dummy variable equal to 1 for branches to control for these effects (Branch).  
The banking literature suggests that in addition to the organizational form, diversification 
increases with the size of bank balance sheets (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). We therefore 
include the logarithm of total assets (Size) and its square (Sizesq) to control for a potentially 
nonlinear relationship between bank size and efficiency. We also use a dummy variable (Big) to 
identify the four largest banks in terms of total assets. These global players have privileged 
access to international capital and money markets.  
The literature suggests that higher capital ratios are associated with better management. We 
use the ratio of equity book value to total assets (ETA) as a proxy for risk. This is approximately 
equal to the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio (Berger et al., 2010). A high ratio suggests low leverage 
and therefore lower risk (see Pasiouras, 2008, among others). Empirical evidence suggests that 
regulators may allow relatively efficient banks to operate with higher leverage (Hughes and 
Moon, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1993; Hughes and Mester, 1998). Other studies, such as 
Altunbas et al. (2007), find that financial capital can significantly influence bank cost and profit 
efficiency. Curi et al. (2013) find that well-capitalized banks in Luxembourg tend to score higher 
in terms of technical efficiency.  
Lastly, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) may moderate the effect of diversification on bank 
efficiency, and this is the case for Luxembourg banks, which underwent a broad consolidation 
process (Curi et al., 2011). There is extensive literature on the efficiency gains from European 
and U.S. bank deals (for an overview, see DeYoung et al., 2009). In addition, there is a 
substantial amount of literature that highlights possible time lags between the completion of a 
merger and the realization of gains (e.g., Rhoades, 1998; Calomiris and Karceski, 2000; Houston 
et al., 2001). For instance, according to Berger et al. (1998) a three-year gestation period is 
needed (on average) to restructure a merged bank, given difficulties in, e.g., refocusing lending 
policies and integrating data processing systems and operations. Following Focarelli and Panetta 
(2003), we distinguish the short-run and long-run effect of bank mergers on operational 
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efficiency. Thus, we include a dummy variable (merge_trans) equal to 1 in the transitory period 
(which covers the year of the merger and the next two years) and another dummy variable 
(merge_compl) equal to 1 in the completion period (which includes the subsequent years—from 
the third year to fifth year after the merger). 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
We structure our summary of the empirical analysis into three sections: (i) analysis of 
distribution, (ii) analysis of group efficiencies and (iii) regression analysis.  
 
5.1. Analysis of distribution 
First, we assess the cross-section distribution and the evolution of the diversification indexes 
over time. This analysis will give us insight into two important issues: (i) whether there is a 
unique business model for foreign banks and (ii) whether, due to the crisis and/or structural 
changes over the period under analysis, foreign banks adjusted their business model.  
Our first step is to analyze the cross-section distributions of three diversification indexes over 
time using the kernel density estimator, where we use the Gaussian kernel and optimal 
bandwidth selected by Sheather and Jones method (1991). We categorize banks as either focused 
or diversified using the thresholds in the estimated distributions located between peaks. Figure 1 
plots the cross-section distributions. More focused banks will appear on the left, and more 
diversified banks will appear on the right in each of the three dimensions (assets, funding and 
income).   
In presenting the results, we will split the time period into three sub-periods to detect more 
accurately the possible changes in bank diversification given that structural changes might have 
occurred in the environment where the foreign banks under analysis are operating. Specifically, 
we divide the entire period into the period of the consolidation process in the banking industry of 
Luxembourg (1995-2000), the pre-crisis period (2001-2006) and the recent financial crisis period 
(2007-2009). Because the financial crisis period is included in the period under investigation, 
analyzing any change over time of the cross-section distribution will help us to detect whether 
the banks adjusted their business models during the crisis period. Indeed, as noted by Llewellyn 
(2013), bank business models are not static but evolve over time under the influence of a 
complex mix of pressures. In particular, given the crisis, banks face an unprecedented 
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combination of pressures in terms of balance sheets, liquidity and funding; the funding sources 
become difficult, and new regulatory pressures appear, focusing them on capital and liquidity 
requirements. All those pressures along with the weakness of the macroeconomic situation 
should contribute to change in the bank business model. 
Observing plot (a) in Figure 1, in the asset dimension, the first sub-period (1995-2000) is 
characterized by two peaks, suggesting that one group of asset-diversified banks (peak near 50%) 
coexists with another group of focused banks (secondary peak near 20%). From 2001-2006, the 
right peak appears to split into two groups of diversified banks, whereas the left tail flattens, 
indicating more heterogeneity within the industry. During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the 
main peak falls and shifts left to approximately 37%, suggesting less diversification. The 
threshold for activity diversification is approximately 0.35. 
In the funding dimension, the more peaked pattern in plot (b) suggests more diversification 
than in the asset dimension. However, here, the distribution also becomes flatter over time, 
suggesting increasing heterogeneity across banks. The main peak, at approximately 50%, drops 
sharply from the 1995-2000 period to the 2001-2006 period and a bit further during the crisis, 
gradually shifting left each time (less diversification). The compensating rise in the left tail also 
suggests that many banks reduced their funding diversification. Thus, the threshold of funding 
diversification is also approximately 0.35. 
Lastly, in the income dimension, plot (c) suggests the opposite pattern, with banks shifting 
towards higher diversification. The peak at the left in 1995-2000 drops dramatically in 2001-
2008; some banks moved to higher diversification, which is made apparent by a new peak to the 
right at approximately 50%. During the financial crisis, the new peak on the right is virtually 
unchanged, but more mass has shifted from the left tail to higher levels of diversification. Thus, 
the threshold of income diversification is approximately 0.30. 
Overall, for each panel, we observe that there is no unique business model for all foreign 
banks in Luxembourg; diversified and focused foreign banks coexist in all three diversification 
dimensions. That is, not all foreign banks fit one unique business model.  
Moreover, regarding the evolution of the diversification index over time, a shift can be 
observed to a more focused bank strategy in assets and funding but not in income.  
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Figure 1: DIV Index Distributions 
 
(a) Asset diversification (ADIV) 
 
(b) Funding diversification (FDIV) 
 
(c) Income diversification (IDIV) 
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To test whether these changes in the estimated distribution are statistically significant, Table 1 
reports Li statistics and their bootstrapped p-value under the null hypothesis of equal distribution. 
 
Table 1: Test for Equality of Distributions across Three Periods 
Null Hypothesis (H0) Li Statistic p-value Decision on H0 
Asset diversification    
pdf (1995-2000)= pdf (2001-2006) 2.885 0.009 Reject 
pdf (2001-2006)= pdf (2007-2009) 6.356 0.000 Reject 
Funding diversification    
pdf (1995-2000)= pdf (2001-2006) 4.184 0.002 Reject 
pdf (2001-2006)= pdf (2007-2009) 0.702 0.344 Do not reject 
Income diversification    
pdf (1995-2000)= pdf (2001-2006) 12.432 0.000 Reject 
pdf (2001-2006)= pdf (2007-2009) 0.040 0.957 Do not reject 
Note: pdf stands for probability density function. 
 
The first two rows of Table 1 indicate that the changes over time in the distribution of asset 
diversification across banks are statistically significant (leading to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis with a p-value equal or close to 0). The middle panel reports that the distribution of 
funding diversification changed significantly from 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2006 but that 
evidence of change during the financial crisis is not statistically significant. The bottom panel 
reflects the same result for the distribution of income diversification. In other words, the 
distribution of diversification in all three dimensions changed from 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 
to 2006, but only asset diversification changed significantly from 2007 to 2009.  
Overall, it seems that most of the business model changes observed from Figure 1 are 
supported by the Li test. Notably, the Li statistic shows that the real strategy followed by the 
foreign banks consists of changing their business model over time on the three distributions 
(assets, funding and income). They decide to become more focused on assets and funding, but 
they seem to have chosen to be more diversified in income. Moreover, during the financial crisis, 
the foreign banks appear to continue to change their business model but just in asset dimension, 
becoming more focused. Thus, the results seem to suggest that (i) there coexist two business 
models across time, and (ii) the foreign bank business model is not static. Therefore, apparently, 
the statement that the bank business model is not static over time can be confirmed (Llewellyn, 
2013). 
The results obtained encouraged us to analyze the sample further and to investigate whether 
the diversification strategy followed by the two organizational forms that foreign banks decide to 
adopt when they operate across borders is different. In other words, we next analyzed the likely 
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trade-off between diversification and organizational form. To check for this research question, 
the share of subsidiaries and branches in the diversified and focused categories (based on our 
thresholds) is reported in Table 2. In all three periods, approximately two thirds of all banks are 
diversified subsidiaries in the three dimensions in all periods, except for income diversification 
in the consolidation period, which is less than half. However, there also exists one significant 
share of subsidiaries that chooses a focused strategy. Prior to the financial crisis, Luxembourg 
branch banks developed both diversification and focused strategies in terms of assets and 
funding mix while maintaining focused strategies in terms of income mix. However, during the 
financial crisis, most of the branch banks refocused their strategies in assets and funding. 
Notably, although the subsidiaries tend to slightly decrease over time their share distribution in 
terms of a diversified business model on assets and funding, the amount of subsidiaries opting 
for a more diversified strategy in income increases remarkably. However, the number of 
branches that select a more focused strategy in assets increase over time, specifically during the 
financial crisis. The share of branches that adopt a diversified strategy on income is almost stable 
along the two periods before the crisis, although it increases slightly during the crisis. Finally, it 
seems that branches adopt dynamic behavior in the funding business model because they shift 
their business models from more focused to more diversified and then more focused along the 
entire period.  
 
Table 2: Breakdown into Organizational Form for Each Period 
Period Bank 
Focused    Diversified 
ADIV FDIV IDIV   ADIV FDIV IDIV 
Consolidation Period  
(1995-2000)                                                                                                                         
All 32.78% 35.87% 62.48%   67.22% 64.13% 37.52% 
Subsidiary 24.66% 26.31% 46.24% 
 
54.78% 53.13% 33.20% 
Branch 8.12% 9.56% 16.24%   12.44% 11.00% 4.32% 
Pre-crisis (2001-2006)                                                                                                                                                
All 35.78% 38.66% 46.40%   64.22% 61.34% 53.60% 
Subsidiary 28.44% 32.63% 33.16% 
 
55.70% 51.51% 50.98% 
Branch 7.34% 6.03% 13.24%   8.52% 9.83% 2.62% 
Crisis (2007-2009)                                                                                                                                                
All 43.02% 45.02% 46.15% 
 
56.98% 54.99% 53.84% 
Subsidiary 28.49% 31.34% 32.19% 
 
52.14% 49.29% 48.43% 
Branch 14.53% 13.68% 13.96%   4.84% 5.70% 5.41% 
 
Overall, this preliminary analysis suggests that branches and subsidiaries run similar business 
models; i.e., focused and diversified strategies are followed by both types of organizational 
forms, despite their legal and regulatory differences. Thus, it appears that contrary to the general 
wisdom that branches usually follow a focused business model, we see that many branches also 
adopt a diversified business model just as subsidiaries usually do.  
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5.2. Analysis of group efficiencies 
The findings obtained in the previous subsection regarding the coexistence of different 
business models—focused versus diversified—led us to address the main research question of 
the paper—i.e., the effectiveness of business model—using technical efficiency. As we note in 
the empirical research strategy section, when different business models appear, it is more 
appropriate to group banks and estimate their aggregate or group efficiency and corresponding 
confidence intervals. In particular, based on the results obtained in our first step, we now turn to 
estimate group efficiency for the diversified and focused banks in the three-diversification 
dimensions. Moreover, because our previous analysis suggests that the business model strategy 
of the foreign banks has changed over time, the effectiveness of the business model strategy is 
analyzed along the three time periods.  
Table 3 reports the weighted group-efficiency estimates for diversified and focused banks. 
The weighted group-efficiency estimates and their confidence intervals and bias corrections are 
obtained following the Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) group-wise heterogeneous sub-sampling 
bootstrap approach with 2000 bootstrap replications.
 
Because the aim of the analysis is to explain 
inefficiency, group-efficiency scores are reported à la Farrell; scores closer to unity are banks 
that are more efficient. However, in the discussion, we use brackets to report efficiency scores à 
la Shepard (1970), which are the reciprocals of Farrell-type efficiency scores and represent the 
relative level of efficiency in percentage terms. Table 4 presents the Li statistics and relative p-
values to test for efficiency equality between focused and diversified foreign banks.  
In terms of asset diversification, the weighted group efficiencies (bias-corrected) show that 
during the consolidation period, diversified banks benefitted more from higher efficiency 
(85.9%) than did more focused banks (77.5%). Moving to the pre-crisis period, we observe that 
in contrast to the previous period, focused banks showed higher efficiency levels (89.4%) than 
diversified banks (86.7%). However, both groups improved their efficiency. During the financial 
crisis, both bank groups experienced an inefficiency increase; however, focused banks reached 
approximately 63%, whereas diversified banks limited deterioration to 69.7%. The analysis of 
the related confidence intervals suggests little overlap for each pairwise comparison, except for 
the pre-crisis period. This finding is confirmed by the RD statistics (Table 4); the confidence 
intervals of this statistic do not include 1 during the consolidation period and the financial crisis. 
On the contrary, such confidence intervals include 1 during the pre-crisis period, suggesting 
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there is no evidence of a statistically significant difference in the efficiency performance between 
the two groups.   
Turning to the funding diversification, the weighted group efficiencies (bias-corrected) show 
that focused banks benefitted more from higher efficiency levels than did diversified banks over 
the three periods. During the consolidation period, focused banks are characterized by 89.2% 
efficiency, compared to 83.1% among diversified banks. During the pre-crisis period, focused 
banks improved their efficiency to 94.5%, compared to 85.6% for diversified banks. Both groups 
of banks suffered from efficiency loss during the financial crisis, but diversified banks reached 
66.4% efficiency, compared to 73.9% for focused banks. In this case, the RD statistics confirm 
that the differences among focused and diversified banks are statistically significant in all three 
periods. Thus, banks with focused funding strategies are found to be persistently more efficient, 
although they also saw their performance deteriorate during the financial crisis.  
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Table 3: Weighted Group Efficiency 
Prospective Period Orientation 
 Weighted Group 
Efficiency 
(bias-corrected) 
Lower Bound 
(95%) 
Upper Bound 
(95%) 
Asset 
Consolidation Period (1995-2000) 
Focused 1.290 1.254 1.313 
Diversif. 1.163 1.116 1.197 
     
Pre-crisis (2001-2006) 
Focused 1.118 1.074 1.146 
Diversif. 1.154 1.130 1.169 
     
Crisis (2007-2009) 
Focused 1.593 1.491 1.644 
Diversif. 1.435 1.323 1.494 
Funding 
Consolidation Period (1995-2000) 
Focused 1.121 1.079 1.147 
Diversif. 1.204 1.160 1.232 
     
Pre-crisis (2001-2006) 
Focused 1.058 1.020 1.084 
Diversif. 1.168 1.136 1.187 
     
Crisis (2007-2009) 
Focused 1.353 1.226 1.415 
Diversif. 1.506 1.404 1.557 
Income 
Consolidation Period (1995-2000) 
Focused 1.139 1.097 1.166 
Diversif. 1.363 1.326 1.385 
     
Pre-crisis (2001-2006) 
Focused 1.116 1.079 1.141 
Diversif. 1.199 1.168 1.218 
     
Crisis (2007-2009) 
Focused 1.322 1.218 1.371 
Diversif. 1.709 1.596 1.769 
Note: Weighted Group Efficiency (bias-corrected) estimates are obtained by the Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) group-
wise heterogeneous sub-sampling bootstrap method, with 2000 bootstrap replications both for bias correction and 
confidence intervals.  
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Table 4: Relative Difference Statistics Comparing the Weighted Group Efficiency  
Period Prospective 
Relative Difference 
Statistic Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound  
Decision on H0 
(bias-corrected) 
Consolidation Period  
(1995-2000) 
Asset mix 1.115 1.08 1.151 Reject H0 
Funding mix 0.926 0.89 0.963 Reject H0 
Income mix 0.811 0.773 0.844 Reject H0 
Pre-crisis  
(2001-2006) 
Asset mix 0.966 0.922 1 Do not reject H0 
Funding mix 0.899 0.86 0.936 Reject H0 
Income mix 0.925 0.885 0.96 Reject H0 
Crisis  
(2007-2009) 
Asset mix 1.126 1.046 1.211 Reject H0 
Funding mix 0.877 0.779 0.956 Reject H0 
Income mix 0.723 0.643 0.81 Reject H0 
 
Note: The Relative Difference (RD) statistic  is the ratio of the weighted group efficiency of focused banks over that 
of diversified banks. Values above unity suggest that diversified banks are more efficient than focused banks. If the 
bootstrapped confidence interval defined between the lower and upper bound values does not contain unity, then the 
null hypothesis of the equality of the two group-inefficiency estimates (focused vs. diversified) is rejected in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis that the diversified banks are more inefficient, as a group, than focused banks if RD 
(bias-corrected)<1 and more efficient if RD (bias-corrected)>1.   
 
From the income diversification point of view, the weighted group efficiencies (bias-
corrected) show that focused banks, as a group, attained higher efficiency levels than did 
diversified banks over the three periods. During the consolidation period, focused banks are 
characterized by 87.8% efficiency compared to 73.4% among diversified banks. During the pre-
crisis period, focused banks improved their efficiency to 89.6%, compared to 88.4% for 
diversified banks. Both groups of banks suffered from efficiency loss during the financial crisis, 
but diversified banks reached 58.5% efficiency compared to 75.6% for focused banks. In this 
case, the RD statistics confirm that the differences among focused and diversified banks are 
statistically significant in all three periods. Thus, banks with focused income strategies are 
persistently more efficient, although they also saw their performance deteriorate during the 
financial crisis. 
Overall, the results suggest that foreign banks operating in a financial center benefit from 
higher efficiency when they focus their funding and income strategies but diversify their asset 
mix. Thus, the more efficient business model for foreign banks in Luxembourg appears to be 
focused with regard to funding and income and diversified with respect to assets. 
In conclusion, when the differences in group efficiency are used as benchmark to test for the 
most effective business model strategy, the results suggest that whereas diversification is the 
most effective business model for Luxembourg foreign banks in the asset dimension, the focused 
model is the optimal business model to adopt in the funding and income dimension. Regarding 
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those results and comparing them with the actual decision made for Luxembourg foreign banks, 
it can be stated that prior to the financial crisis, apparently, it seems that foreign banks made the 
right decision in terms of the most efficient business model only through their funding strategy. 
Prior the financial crisis, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that funding-focused and income-focused banks 
reach higher efficiency than funding- and income-diversified banks, and less evidence of 
technical efficiency superiority is found among asset-focused banks. However, Figure 1 suggests 
that foreign banks evolved towards more focused asset and funding strategies and a more 
diversified income strategy. During the financial crisis, Figure 1 suggests that banks adopted a 
more focused asset mix, and funding and income diversification remained largely unchanged 
with respect to the previous period, where foreign banks already moved toward a more focused 
funding and diversified income strategy. Regarding the optimality of this strategy decision in 
terms of technical efficiency, it seems that again, the focused funding strategy is the right one but 
not the income- diversified and asset-focused strategies.  
Overall, the above results suggest that although foreign banks in Luxembourg choose their 
optimal business models in terms of funds over time, they decline to operate under their optimal 
business model in terms of income and assets because they opt to diversify their income and 
focus their assets, although both strategies seem to be non-optimal. 
 
5.3. Regression analysis 
The efficiency analysis performed in the previous subsection indicates significant differences 
between diversified and focused foreign banks in the three diversification dimensions (except for 
the asset dimension from 2001-2006). Efficiency differences among foreign banks can be used as 
a benchmark of identifying the optimal business model strategy if there exist no specific 
characteristics of foreign banks that explain such efficiency differences. Thus, not taking into 
account foreign bank specific characteristics, which makes the business model strategy optimal, 
may wrongly attribute the efficiency differences that arise from the business model strategy. To 
address this issue, the third step is to estimate the relationship between diversification and 
technical inefficiency to disentangle the possible mitigating effects related to bank-specific 
characteristics along the bank organizational form, considering the latter as an important aspect 
of foreign banks. To perform this analysis, the truncated regression with bootstrap proposed by 
Simar and Wilson (2007) is used. Because DEA bias-corrected estimates are expressed à la 
Farrell (greater than unity), negative coefficients indicate a positive effect on efficiency.   
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First, we present the results obtained by taking into account organizational form, big banks, 
size, equity and the effect of mergers as bank-specific characteristics. The results are presented in 
Table 5 for the three periods, estimated separately for diversification in the assets, funding and 
income dimensions.  
The first thing to note is that during the consolidation period, the coefficient of the ADIV 
index is negative and significant at the 1% significance level, whereas FDIV and IDIV are 
positive and significant. These results are consistent with the results of the test of the aggregate 
efficiency equality of diversified and focused foreign banks (Table 3), where specific banks 
characteristics were not controlled for. However, a diversified assets mix appears to increase 
foreign bank efficiency only during the consolidation period; this effect appears to reverse the 
sign during the pre-crisis period. During the financial crisis, the coefficient on asset 
diversification is positive but not statistically significant. Thus, during the consolidation and pre-
crisis period, the differences in efficiency among foreign banks arise from the asset business 
model strategy but not during the crisis period. It is notable that although bank-specific 
characteristics do not mitigate the relationship between the asset business model and efficiency 
founded from the efficiency comparison of the focused vs. diversified banks, those 
characteristics help to detect a negative relationship between foreign banks’ asset diversification 
and efficiency during the pre-crisis period. Moreover, the regression analysis shows that there is 
a lack of a role played by asset diversification on the foreign bank efficiency during the financial 
crisis. Turning to diversification in the funding dimension, estimated coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all periods, including the period that encompassed the 
financial crisis. Finally, the coefficients on income diversification are also positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all periods. In addition, the negative effect of income 
and funding diversification appears to increase over time. These results suggest that funding and 
income diversification reduces technical efficiency, confirming the results in Table 3 once the 
bank-specific characteristics are included.   
According to the above results, an interesting novel finding of this work is the apparent robust 
evidence that diversification in general seems to dampen technical efficiency, and it appears that 
diversification does not play different roles depending on the strategy dimension considered. 
More specifically, although assets diversification has a positive effect on foreign banks’ 
efficiency during the consolidation period (in line with the findings of Stiroh, 2004, for US banks 
and Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010, for a worldwide sample of banks analyzed up to 2008); 
however, this positive effect is not supported throughout time. On the contrary, our results are 
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more consistent with the findings for Chinese banks (Berger et al. 2010), according to which 
focused Chinese banks are associated with higher profit and cost efficiency. There are 
differences between the Chinese and Luxembourg banking sector, but these two sectors share the 
problem of cooperation with the directions of an external institution, i.e., the government, for 
Chinese banks (as mentioned by Berger et al. 2010) and home parent banks’ directions for 
Luxembourg banks, instead of making independent decision.  
Furthermore, the regressions in Table 5 provide support for the argument that diversified and 
focused banks may coexist because diversification enhances efficiency for some bank types and 
specialization for others. For instance, whereas diversification in the different dimensions and 
periods decreases efficiency, except for the case of the assets diversification during the 
consolidation period, this effect might be lessened or expanded for branches compared to 
subsidiaries. To test not only which organizational form is the most technically efficient but also 
which business model is optimal for each organizational form, the Branch dummy variable and 
its interaction with the organizational form by crossing the Branch dummy with the 
diversification variable (DIV x Branch) is included in the regression analysis. Recall that Table 2 
shows that some branches diversified their business model, and others made it more focused over 
time. The results show that there is a negative and statistically significant effect of branches on 
inefficiency in all three diversification dimensions and in all periods, except for the financial 
crisis period. Thus, although the organizational branch form was apparently more efficient than 
subsidiary organization during the consolidation and pre-crisis period, subsidiary was the 
organizational form that suffered less deterioration in technical efficiency during the financial 
crisis. Regarding the business strategy of branches, the results show that from 1995-2000, 
branches that diversified in assets were more efficient, whereas branches that diversified in 
funding were less efficient. The opposite is true during the period 2001-2006. This finding is in 
line with the results in Table 2, which show that during the first sub-period, most of the 
diversified branches were asset diversified. During the second sub-period, there was a shift 
toward more funding diversification, and indeed, we find that these branches that diversified in 
funding were more efficient. However, during the first two sub-periods, few branches diversified 
in income. Indeed, we do not find any effect for the consolidation period; however, those 
branches that decided to diversify income during the pre-crisis period were less efficient. The 
results during the financial crisis provide evidence that although the diversification in funding 
and income was efficiency destroying (in line with the previous period), if branches diversified 
in the three dimensions, they better survived the financial crisis. However, Table 2 shows that 
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during the financial crisis, a large share of branches opted to shift toward a more funding-focused 
business model, whereas income diversification strategy was adopted for a somewhat higher 
share of branches. 
 The estimated coefficient of the Big dummy variable suggests that the four largest banks 
enjoyed a statistically significant efficiency advantage only in the two sub-periods before the 
financial crisis (1995-2000 for the three diversification dimensions and 2001-2006 only for the 
funding dimension). When the Big bank dummy is crossed with the diversification variable (DIV 
x Big), these large banks appear to have suffered a relatively larger loss of efficiency from 
increased diversification in the three dimensions from 1995-2000 and funding diversification 
from 2001-2006. For the financial crisis, this interaction term is not statistically significant for 
any diversification dimension. This suggests that contrary to the general wisdom, the 
combination of size and diversification does not necessarily lead to operational efficiency gains. 
The estimated coefficients on the logarithm of total assets (Size) suggest that banks with 
larger size benefited from higher technical efficiency (lower inefficiency) from 2001-2006 in the 
funding dimension. However, during the financial crisis, the coefficient changed signs (the 
variance of the estimated coefficient also increased), suggesting that larger banks incurred higher 
inefficiency. The square of the total assets (Sizesq) has a negative effect on efficiency from 
2007-2009, suggesting a non-monotonic relationship during the financial crisis. The ratio of 
equity to total assets (ETA) has a positive effect on efficiency in most cases, suggesting that 
well-capitalized foreign banks tend to run better. The coefficient increased substantially during 
the financial crisis.  
Finally, the dummy variables separating the M&A process into short-run (merge_trans) and 
long-run (merge_compl) effects gives evidence of the “merger puzzle” concerning operational 
efficiency. Our results suggest that in the short run, mergers reduce operational efficiency 
(significantly in most cases), but this inefficiency dissipates quickly, as is evidenced by the 
statistically insignificant coefficient of the merge_compl dummy in most cases and the 
statistically significant coefficient with an opposite sign in a few cases. 
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        Table 5: Truncated Regression Results 
Consolidation Period (1995-2000) Pre-crisis (2001-2006)   Financial Crisis (2007-2009) 
Variable ADIV FDIV IDIV   ADIV FDIV IDIV   ADIV FDIV IDIV 
Constant 1.473*** 0.645 0.087  1.666** 1.802*** 1.431*  -19.793** -6.370 -1.642 
DIV -0.242*** 0.259*** 0.736***  0.171*** 0.519*** 0.451***  0.436 1.739*** 3.038*** 
Branch -0.229*** -0.414*** -0.154***  -0.355*** -0.097*** -0.052**  1.047** 1.959*** 0.293 
Big -3.664*** -2.122* -0.351*  -0.326 -1.203*** 0.299  -0.085 -1.211 0.817 
            
DIV x Branch -0.152*** 0.338*** 0.127  0.611*** -0.075* 0.181*  -5.325*** -7.591*** -0.282* 
DIV x Big 5.937*** 4.245*** 1.648***  0.838 2.383*** -0.625  1.522 2.781 -1.753 
            
Size 0.079*** 0.150 0.117  -0.012 -0.027*** -0.035  2.456** 1.064* 0.429 
Sizesq -0.004*** -0.006 -0.004  -0.001 0.0009* 0.0003  -0.072** -0.036* -0.018* 
ETA -0.624*** -0.838*** -0.452***  -0.594*** -1.212*** -0.353***  -2.762*** -2.865*** -1.921*** 
merge_trans 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.069***  0.060*** 0.036** 0.030  0.437*** 0.356* 0.457 
merge_compl 0.058*** -0.019 0.0008  -0.012 -0.009 -0.031  0.166 0.109 -0.243 
            
2
u  0.033*** 0.033*** 0.020***  0.021*** 0.016*** 0.0186***  0.823*** 0.627*** 0.722*** 
Note: 
***. **. *
 stand for statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations 
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5.4. Robustness tests 
The conventional wisdom in banking is that diversification enhances bank performance, but 
there is a lack of consensus for confirming this assertion from the empirical literature. Based on 
this notion plus the results obtained in this study, which rejects that statement, we extend our 
regression analysis, attempting to test the robustness of our results. Recently, one new strand of 
literature appears that aims to control for the endogeneity of a firm’s decision to diversify. In 
particular, this new argument is defended based on the unclear finding obtained from empirical 
analyses of the extent to which diversification increases or decreases shareholder value in profit-
oriented firms or bank performance (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Goddard et al., 2008, among 
others). Thus, following this new strand of literature, we control for the possible endogeneity 
problem of the diversification variable as a robustness test of our finding. To address this issue, 
we have re-estimated our model following the estimation procedure suggested by Simar and 
Wilson (2007) to be consistent with our regression analysis performed and incorporated the 
diversification indicators along the three diversification dimensions with a time lag. Table 6 
shows that when the endogeneity of a foreign bank’s decision to diversify in evaluating the effect 
of diversification on technical efficiency is controlled for, our previous results remain the same. 
The results confirm our findings that diversification in general destroys technical efficiency 
independently of the strategy dimension considered, except, as before, for the case of asset 
diversification and only for the period of consolidation. Moreover, when endogeneity is 
controlled for, the argument that diversified and focused banks may coexist is also confirmed. 
Additionally, the results verified our previous findings that although branches were more 
efficient than subsidiaries during the two periods before the financial crisis, subsidiaries 
supported a lower deterioration of technical efficiency during the financial crisis. Moreover, if 
branches diversified in the three dimensions, they better survived the financial crisis. The cross 
product Div*Branches during the consolidation period becomes not statistically significant in the 
case of the asset dimension. Overall, our previous findings are robust.  
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Table 6: Truncated Regression Results with Lag 
Consolidation Period (1995-2000) Pre-crisis (2001-2006)   Financial Crisis (2007-2009) 
Variable ADIV FDIV IDIV   ADIV FDIV IDIV   ADIV FDIV IDIV 
Constant 2.679 0.411 -1.252  0.942* 1.018*** 1.599***  -22.189* -5.640*** -3.548 
LDIV -0.269*** 0.206*** 0.694***  0.156*** 0.452*** 0.405***  0.609 0.889* 4.054*** 
Branch -0.292*** -0.468*** -0.147***  -0.255*** 0.018 -0.059*  1.223 1.797*** 1.748*** 
Big -3.704*** -1.376*** -0.330  -0.433 -1.778*** 0.047  -0.076 0.654 -0.348 
            
LDIV x Branch 0.067 0.497*** 0.062  0.393* -0.316*** 0.173  -4.865* -6.878*** -3.465* 
LDIV x Big 5.957*** 3.023*** 1.673  1.023* 3.368*** 0.491  1.651 -0.751 4.633 
            
Size -0.049*** 0.173 0.252***  0.059 0.047*** -0.046  2.694** 0.989*** 0.498 
Sizesq -0.001*** -0.007* -0.007***  -0.003 -0.003* 0.0005  -0.078** -0.034*** -0.019 
ETA -0.510*** -0.725*** -0.174***  -0.595*** -0.957*** -0.380***  -2.002** -2.005*** 0.759 
merge_trans 0.098*** 0.112* 0.076***  0.069*** 0.037** 0.042*  0.473 0.402** 0.268 
merge_compl -0.026*** -0.025 -0.013  -0.005 -0.018 -0.030  0.212 0.078 0.052 
            
2
u  0.033*** 0.034*** 0.021***  0.022*** 0.018*** 0.019***  0.883*** 0.618*** 0.748*** 
Note: 
***. **. *
 stand for statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations 
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Finally, because the efficiency of foreign banks can be affected by specific parent characteristics, as an 
additional robustness test, we re-estimated our regression with and without lagging the diversification 
variable by controlling for this possible effect. Indeed, in the empirical analysis of foreign bank 
efficiency, there exists one important strand in the current literature oriented toward investigating whether 
the country-level and firm-level characteristics of multinational banks determine differences in foreign 
bank efficiency in the host nation (Sturm and Williams, 2004, 2008, among others). Among the different 
parent bank effects, it is often argued that the experience of operating internationally is one important 
characteristic that enables a multinational bank to succeed in the host nation. Following Tschoegl (1982), 
we will pay attention to general experiences in place of particular experiences in operating in one 
particular country. To control for it, we define one proxy variable to indicate the number of countries 
where the parent bank operates (NCPB). To build this variable, we have elaborated a new database that 
contains for each foreign bank in Luxembourg the number of countries where its parent bank operates 
around the world.
13
 The findings show that once the NCPB is controlled for (with and without controlling 
for endogeneity in the diversification decision), the results are consistent with our previous results in all 
the regressions. Moreover, the results suggest that parent banks that have direct funds and resources to 
branches established in a large number of countries around the world are less efficient. It is notable that 
although this effect is statistically significant during the two periods before the financial crisis, it seems 
that the parent bank effect controlled for in performance does not matter during the financial crisis. These 
tables are available upon request.  
                                                             
13
 We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for incorporating the effect of parent bank on efficiency 
and particularly to define this type of variable. The database has been built by hand looking bank-by-bank on the 
Bankscope database.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this work, we analyze the business models adopted by foreign banks operating in financial 
centers both before and during the financial crisis. This analysis is potentially both policy 
relevant and of independent research interest, given the pressure foreign banks face to maintain 
market shares, remain competitive and efficiently serve their home parent banks. 
To our knowledge, there is no study in the literature that investigates foreign banks’ 
diversification in terms of their asset, funding and income dimensions to analyze the optimal 
business model. 
We focus on a unique data set of foreign banks in Luxembourg over the period from 1995-
2009. First, we analyze diversification in the assets, funding and income mix across banks and 
across time and document the evolution of business models among foreign banks. Then, we 
estimate technical efficiency separately for focused and diversified banks and test for differences 
in aggregate efficiency across groups as the first benchmark to test the optimality of foreign 
banks’ business models. Finally, we estimate a truncated regression linking individual technical 
efficiency scores to bank-specific characteristics and diversification in different dimensions as an 
essential analysis to accurately identify the optimal business model. The empirical research 
strategy combines recently developed bootstrap techniques applied to the Li test, weighted DEA 
and truncated regression. 
Our first main result reveals that the most efficient business model for foreign banks in 
Luxembourg appears to be a focused asset, funding and income strategy. Indeed,  the diversified-
asset strategy, consistent with the traditional banking theory based on delegated monitoring—
which suggests that bank efficiency increases with diversification—is founded only during the 
consolidation period. Greater funding diversification or income diversification is generally 
associated with lower technical efficiency, and its effect became more negative during the 
financial crisis. Our finding show apparent robust evidence that diversification in general 
destroys technical efficiency and does not play different roles depending on the strategy 
dimension considered. This finding implies possible limits to how far foreign banks should 
diversify away from their traditional lending, deposit-taking activities and non-traditional 
activities.  
Our second main result suggests that the organizational forms of banks matter both prior to 
and during the financial crisis, although it follows different patterns. In fact, branches benefitted 
from greater efficiency than bank subsidiaries prior to the financial crisis whereas during the 
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financial crisis, subsidiary banks seemed to be the organizational form that suffered less 
deterioration in efficiency during the financial crisis. Thus, branches may be preferable to 
subsidiaries from a technical efficiency point of view; however, bank subsidiaries can also be 
efficient, and this organizational form is stronger during the financial crisis 
The last important result is that, contrary to the general wisdom that branches usually follow 
focused business models, branches and subsidiaries might adopt both diversified and focused 
business models, and these models might coexist. During the consolidation period, asset-
diversified branches and asset-diversified subsidiaries enjoyed efficiency advantages. Neither 
branches nor subsidiaries benefitted from greater diversification in funding or income. However, 
during the financial crisis, diversified branches in the three dimensions suffered enhance 
efficiency. Overall, although the choice of business model matters for technical efficiency, there 
is no single business model that fits all foreign banks when we distinguish between branch and 
subsidiary banks. Thus, neither structure is obviously preferable. As complementary results, our 
empirical evidence contrasts with the general belief that increasing both diversification and size 
benefits banks in terms of better efficiency. The results apparently suggest that large foreign 
banks are also less efficient. Finally, well-capitalized banks appear to be more efficient, and 
mergers cause short-term efficiency losses, which may be compensated in the long term.  
Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that the EU Second Banking Directive may not 
provide the right incentives for banks operating in the financial center of Luxembourg to develop 
efficient business models, at least on the income and funding side. In particular, the results 
suggest that organizational form moderates the effect of diversification on foreign bank 
efficiency. From a policy point of view, this may contribute to the discussion of how foreign 
banks should be regulated in Luxembourg and other financial centers. A natural extension for 
future research would be to study whether foreign bank business models oriented towards 
focused funding and income are sustainable for the host country. 
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